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Abstract: This paper evaluates the impact of a recent Norwegian family policy reform. The 
reform provides benefits of up to NOK 3000 per month to all families with 1 -3 year old 
children, who do not utilise state subsidised day care centres. We investigate the reform’s 
effect on parents’ labour force participation. Our findings suggest that, on average, women’s 
labour force participation decreases and specialisation of work between couples increases 
after the reform. When we evaluate the reform’s impact in association with women’s 
schooling we find that the decrease in the labour force participation of mothers who have 
university level schooling is larger as compared with mothers who have less than university 
schooling.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many empirical studies support the notion that the presence of young children typically 
increases the value of women’s time at home (see Gronau 1973; Leibowitz and Klerman 
1995; Nakamura and Nakamura 1994), leading to a decrease in her labour market activity. 
However, the labour force participation of mothers with pre school children is higher in 
Norway than in many of the other West European countries. In 1997, the labour force 
participation rate among married and cohabiting mothers was 75 percent if the youngest child 
was less than 3 years old and was 83 percent if the child was 3-6 years old (Statistics Norway 
98). Empirical studies on Scandinavian data suggest that high quality public childcare 
encourage labour market activity of women with preschool children (see, for instance, 
Gustafsson and Stafford 1992; Kravdal 1996). 
    
In the spring of 1998 the Norwegian government decided to introduce cash benefits up to 
NOK 3000 (approximately € 375) per month to parents with children of 1-3 years old, who do 
not utilise state subsidised day care facilities. This amount is roughly equivalent to the state 
subsidy per child to day care centres. Parents that utilise some, but not all day care are entitled 
to receive a proportionally lower cash benefit.  
 
Economic theory suggests that public provision of day care increases efficiency in the 
economy. The argument is based on the income tax wedge between home production and 
market work. Due to this wedge too little market work is provided. Childcare subsidies 
increase efficiency by stimulating the labour force participation of mothers, thereby 
increasing the tax base and mitigating the effects of the income tax (see Blomquist and 
Christiansen 1995; Bergstrom and Blomquist 1996). Whether a shift from childcare subsidies   3
to cash benefits produces efficiency loss is an interesting question that we address later in the 
paper.  
 
The cash benefits offered to parents with children of 1-3 years old are not tested against the 
parents’ labour market participation. It is therefore fully possible for both parents to work 
while receiving benefits. Nonetheless, these benefits increase the costs of childcare centres for 
parents. The empirical literature suggests that high childcare costs have negative effect on 
married women’s labour force participation (see Blau and Robins 1988; Riber 1992). Thus, 
the cash benefits reform may reduce parents’, especially mothers’, labour force participation 
in Norway. Evaluating the effect of the reform on parents’ working behaviour is the m ain 
objective of this paper. Parents’ working behaviour is evaluated along two dimensions: 
specialisation and total market intensity1. 
 
The literature on household economics discusses that a large part of a surplus in the marriage 
is generated from specialisation. If one of the spouses has a comparative advantage in the 
provision of home time to commodity production, while the other one has a comparative 
advantage in earning the income that purchases market inputs, then family utility will be 
maximised by specialisation in the time allocation of the couple (see Becker 1973, 1985; 
Weiss 1997). There is ample evidence for specialisation within the household. Married men 
work longer hours in the market and have substantially higher wages than unmarried men. 
Married women have lower wages and work more at home than unmarried women (see 
Gronau 1986; Daniel 1992; Korenman and Neumark 1992). Due to both social and biological 
factors women have a comparative advantage in the production and care of children. We 
therefore believe that the cash benefits reform particularly increases the value of mothers’ 
                                                   
1Lundberg and Rose (1999) define market intensity as sum of the working hours of a couple and specialisation as 
husband’s working hours – wife’s working hours. We use same definitions in this paper.   4
time at home. Whether consequently specialisation increases in households is an empirical 
question that is addressed in this paper. Lundberg and Rose (1999) emphasise that childcare 
costs also affect parents’ total market intensity. They find that in the United States 
specialisation increases and total market intensity of parents decreases after a childbirth. This 
gives us incentive to evaluate the effect of the cash bene fits reform also on Norwegian 
couples’ total market intensity.     
 
The impact of cash benefits on specialisation and market intensity may differ for groups of 
individuals depending on their characteristics. Becker describes human capital as an important 
determinant of specialisation in households. Human capital analysis assumes that schooling 
raises earnings and productivity in the market sector, which establishes a positive association 
between females’ education and their labour force participation. This in turn leads to a lower 
level of specialisation between couples where wives have higher schooling as compared with 
couples where wives have lower schooling. In addition women with high education, 
experience, and income have significantly lower probabilities of job exits in Norway (see for 
instance, Nilsen, A.E. Risa and A. Torstensen 2000). All this suggests that due to the cash 
benefits reform women with lower level of schooling will be more motivated to reduce 
market work as compared with high level. In order to test this hypothesis we explore the 
effect of cash benefit reform in association with mothers’ schooling.   
 
A number of empirical studies in Norway compare women’s labour force participation before 
and after the cash benefit reform of 98. Hellevik (2000) and Rønsen (2001) report that 
mothers have shifted from full time work to part time work after the introduction of cash 
benefits. Langset, Lian and Thoresen (2000) estimate that the labour supply of working 
women is reduced most in the health sector. A shortcoming of these studies is that they only   5
discuss the labour force participation of the women who receive the cash benefits without 
taking into consideration the problem arising by sample selection bias. In the econometric 
literature a wide range of non-experimental estimators have been proposed to evaluate the 
unbiased effects of social programs (see Heckman and Robb 1985; Moffitt 1991; Heckman, 
Lalonde and Smith 1999). This paper addresses the selection bias problem and defines an 
estimator of the reform on the basis of econometric methods.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reports the source of our data and 
explains our sample. Section 3 specifies the econometric model we use to evaluate the reform 
effect. Section 4 discusses the effect of the cash benefit reform on specialisation and working 
hours of couples. Section 5 concludes our research. 
 
2. Data and Sample 
 
The sources of our data are living standard surveys conducted in April/May 1998 and 1999. 
The 1998 survey was carried out six months before the introduction of cash benefit reforms 
and includes 2436 households. The 1999 survey was conducted six months after the reform 
and includes all mothers in 1998 who still had a pre-school child as well as new mothers who 
had given birth to a child between the surveys. The sample in 1999 totalled 3334 households. 
 
The sample used in this paper includes both participants and non-participants of the cash 
benefit program. We define all parents with a child of age 1 -3, whether they receive or do not 
receive the benefits
2 as participants and all parents with a child of age 3-6 as non-participants. 
By using the living standard surveys of 98 and 99, we form a pseudo panel of these two 
                                                   
2 Almost 70 % of parents with 1-3 year old child choose to receive cash benefits.   6
groups. A genuine panel tracks the same individuals over time, whereas a pseudo panel tracks 
cohorts/ groups over time. A cohort/group in a pseudo panel may very well comprise of 
different set of individuals in each period (see Deaton 1985 for details about pseudo panels).  
 
The total number of observations in our sample is 4382. 2611 of them are for couples with 
children of age 1-3 in 98 or 99. The rest are for couples with children of age 3 -6. There are 
almost 8 % households in the sample where wives’ working hours are higher than their 
husbands. We run regression by excluding those couples but get almost the same results 
(results not shown).  
 
The mean and standard deviation of the important variables in the sample are illustrated in 
Table 1.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. Econometric Specification 
 
We are interested in evaluating the impact of the cash benefit reform of 98 on specialisation, 
total market intensity, and individual working hours of the Norwegian couples. This section 




*  = level of outcome variable for a couple  i who has a 1 -3 years old child at time t if the 
cash benefits reform was not introduced.   7
Yit
**= level of outcome variable for a couple i who has a 1-3 years old child at time t after the 
cash benefits reform was introduced.  
 




it it Y Y - = a                                                                                                                          (3.1)                            
 
Our aim is to obtain an estimator of a, the reform effect. The difficulty arises as we can not 
observe the counterfactual Yit
* directly, but only the values of Yit
* for couples who are not 
eligible to get the cash benefits. In our sample these couples have a child of age 3 -6. The 
estimate of a in this case would be:  
 
) 0 ( ) 1 ( ~ * * * = - = = d Y d Y it it a                                                                                                (3.2) 
  
where d =1 if couples have a child of age 1-3 and d = 0  if couples have a child of age 3-6. 
1
* * = d Yit  and  0
* = d Yit  are the corresponding average values of Yit.  
 
However, the estimator defined in (3.2) is biased because:  
 
0 1
* * = „ = d Y d Y it it                                                                                                             (3.3)                                                                          
  
Even if the cash benefits were not introduced the level of outcome variable for parents with a 
child of age 1-3 would be different as compared with parents with a child of age 3 -6. The   8
main reason for this difference is that the level of parents’ labour force participation varies 
with the age of children .  
 
Using the cohort data before and after the reform we can alleviate the selection bias problem. 
Assume that difference in past levels of outcome variable of parents with 1-3 years old child 
and parents with 3 -6 years old child may adequately control for their difference in Yit
*: 
 









1 = - d Yit  is the average value of outcome variable for parents with 1-3 years old child 
and 0
*
1 = - d Yit for parents with 3-6 years old child in a period before the reform. 
 
 Our estimator is then defined as follows: 
 





* * = - - = - = - - d Y Y d Y Y it it it it a                                                                            (3.5) 
 
To calculate a ˆ , we run a regression on the following equation: 
 
m b b b b + + + + = 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 d d d d Y                                                                                      (3.6) 
 
where d1= 1 if parents have a child of age 1-3; d1=0 if parents have a child of age 3 -6; d2= 1 if 
the time period is after the reform; d2=0 if the time period is before the reform. 
 
By plugging (3.6) into (3.5) we get:   9
 
3 0 2 0 1 0 3 2 1 0 ) ( ) ( ˆ b b b b b b b b b b a = - + - - - + + + =                                                     (3.7) 
   
To estimate the effect of cash benefit reform in association with education level of women, 
we run a regression on the following equation: 
v x d d x d x d x d d d d Y i i i i + + + + + + + + = 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 g g g g b b b b                              (3.8) 
 
where  i x =1 if university level education;  i x =0 if less than university level education; and the 
estimator of the effect of the reform if the university level education  is equal to 3 3 g b + . 
 
An alternative method is to stratify the whole sample with respect to women’s education 
levels and then run regressions on equation (3.6) for each stratified sample. We would 
essentially get the same coefficients by using any of the two methods but standard errors may 
vary. 
 
To control for other variables, we interact each and every variable in the same way as we 
interact education level and run a regression on the following equation: 
h d d d
g g g g b b b b
+ + +
+ + + + + + + + =
i i i
i i i i
y d y d y d
x d d x d x d x d d d d Y
2 3 2 2 1 1
2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 0                                (3.9) 
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4.   Results 
 
The main objective of our research is to evaluate the impact of the reform of 98 on 
specialisation, market intensity, and individual working hours of the Norwegian couples. For 
this purpose we run four regressions on equation (3.6): one for each outcome. Table 2 reports 
the after effects of the cash benefits reform.  
 
We discussed in section 1 that the reform of 98 may increase specialisation among the 
working parents. Our results illustrate that our predictions holds for our sample. We find that 
due to cash benefits couples with children of age 1-3 increase specialisation, by 3.28 hours, 
and decrease market intensity by 2.42 hours per week.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 illustrates that wives’ market work decreases and husbands’ market work increases 
after the reform. The  increase in husbands’ market work is insignificant. We see that 87 
percent of the increased specialisation is caused by a reduction in women’s working hours. 
However, due to some increase in the husband’s market work, fall in a couples’ total market 
intensity remains lower than the decrease in wife’s working hours.  
 
An impact of any social program may differ for groups of individuals depending on their 
characteristics. We discussed in section 1 that mothers’ schooling is one of the important 
determinants o f specialisation and parents’ total market intensity. We therefore explore the 
impact of the reform in association with mothers’ schooling. 
   11 
The household economic models predict a positive association between females’ education 
and their market work leading to a lower level of specialisation between couples. Figure 1 
illustrates the relationship between education and average working hours of women, who have 
1-3 years old children, in our sample. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between wives’ 
education and level of specialisation among couples with 1-3 years old children. As expected 
we observe the positive relationship between women’s education and labour force 
participation and negative relationship between women’s education and level of couples’ 
specialisation in a period before and even after the reform. Nevertheless the average working 
hours for educated women is lower and the level of specialisation is higher in a period after 
the reform as compared with a period before the reform.    
 
[Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Our objective is to estimate the change in high and low educated women’s labour force 
participation and households’ specialisation caused by the cash benefits reform. For this 
purpose we run four regressions by interacting our dependent variables with dummies for 
mothers’ education. The results are illustrated in Table 3.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
We find that the reform affects not only the households where wives have less than university 
schooling but also the households where wives have h igher schooling. The differences 
between the reform’s effects for the two categories of household are statistically insignificant 
but we see the larger coefficients if wives’ have university level education. 
   12 
We find that households where wives have less t han university schooling increase 
specialisation, by 2.48 hours whereas this increase is 5.06 hours in households where wives 
have university level education. Due to cash benefits women with less than university level 
schooling decrease their market work by 2.17 hours. This ratio is 4.28 hours for women with 
higher schooling. In short our findings indicate a clear and profound effect of the reform for 
households where wives have university level education. This contradicts a hypothesis 
claiming that women with lower level schooling will be more motivated by the cash benefits 
reform as compared with high level.   
 
Controlling for age, working sector, number of children and husbands’ education, does not 
change the basic pattern of the results but we get larger coefficients for all the outcome 
variables. We see that all control variables are statistically insignificant. F-tests show that the 
control variables are also jointly insignificant (results not shown). Therefore, we believe that 
results from running regressions without control variables are valid for interpretation.  
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
The main aim of this research was to evaluate the effect of the recent cash benefits reform on 
specialisation and individual working hours of the Norwegian couples. We find that,  on 
average, women reduce their working hours after the reform, leading to an increase in 
specialisation between a husband and a wife and decrease in market intensity of the 
households. The increase in husbands’ working hours is insignificant.    
 
Another objective of this paper was to explore the effect of cash benefits in association with 
mothers’ education. We find that all women reduce their working hours after the reform,   13 
leading to an increase in specialisation between a husband and a wife but the effect is stronger 
for mothers who have higher education as compared with mothers who have less than 
university schooling. This result contradicts a hypothesis claiming that women with lower 
level schooling will be more motivated by the cash benefits as compared with high level.  
 
 
In section 1, we mentioned that tax wedge between home production and market work may 
cause too little production in the labour market. Public provision of day care may increase 
efficiency in the economy by stimulating labour force participation of women. We find that 
the cash benefits reform reduces market work of all women and especially of highly educated 
women. Due to decrease in the supply of skilled labour, the market production may decrease 
substantially. Hence, the cash benefits reform may produce efficiency losses if it causes too 
little production of market work by drawing educated women out of the labour force. 
 
We find that mainly wives reduce their labour force participation after the reform and not 
husbands. This suggests that the cash benefits reform leads to reversal in the development 
towards equal status for men and women in the labour market. Aside from short-term loss of 
income, the time off from paid work may also influence wages and career in the long run, and 
finally the mothers’ pensions.  
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Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviations 
Variable     
Mean            
 
S.Dev 
Wife’s education (more than 12 years of schooling= university)  2.37  0.67 
If Wife’s education university  (38  % of total number)  3.13  0.33 
If Wife’s education not university (62 % of total number)  1.91  0.29 
Husband’s education(more than 12  years of schooling= university)        2.42  0.99 
If Wife’s education university  2.94  1.00 
If Wife’s education not university   2.11  0.85 
Wife’s Working hours  (Per Week)  24.90  15.19 
If Wife’s education university  29.68  12.92 
If Wife’s education not university  21.98  15.73 
Husband’s working hours (Per Week)  41.15  11.35 
If Wife’s education university  41.14  10.10 
If Wife’s education not university  41.16  12.05 
Specialisation (Husband’s working hours-Wife’s working hours)  16.25  18.85 
If Wife’s education university  11.46  16.55 
If Wife’s education not university  19.18  19.56 
Market Intensity (Husband’s working hours+Wife’s working hours)  66.05  19.07 
If Wife’s education university  70.82  16.24 
If Wife’s education not university  63.14  20.06 
Wife’s last year’s income  (in hundreds)  175.30  136.12 
If Wife’s education university  223.52  151.06 
If Wife’s education not university  145.87  116.77 
Husband’s last year’s income (in hundreds)  282.78  144.93 
If Wife’s education university  315.59  180.60 
If Wife’s education not university  262.75  113.43 
Number of children  1.47  0.62 
If Wife’s education university  1.52  0.63 
If Wife’s education not university  1.43  0.61 
Wife’s age  32.13  4.98 
If Wife’s education university  33.63  4.44 
If Wife’s education not university  31.21  5.08 
Dummy if Wife works in the health Sector  0.21  0.41 
If Wife’s education university  0.28  0.44 
If Wife’s education not university  0.17  0.37 
Amount of Cash Benefits received per couple   1485  1170 
If Wife’s education university  1327  1183 
If Wife’s education not university  1585  1151 
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Table2: Effect of Cash Benefits on Specialisation and Market Intensity 
Variables 
0 b   t ratio 
3 b   t ratio 
Specialisation  16.18  21.97  3.28  2.75 
Market Intensity  65.63  87.89  -2.42  -2.00 
Wife’s working hours  24.73  41.65  -2.85  -2.97 
Husband’s working hours  40.90  92.02  0.43  0.60 
         
Number of Observations      4382   
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Table3: Difference in the Effect of Cash Benefits With respect to Wife’s Education Level 
Variables 
0 b   0 g   3 b   3 g   3 3 g b +   3 d  
Specialisation             
No Control Variables  18.73  -6.57  2.43  2.63  5.06   
  (20.30)  (-4.44)  (1.64)   (1.09)  (2.68)    
With Control Variables  19.35  -6.81  3.63  2.00  5.63   
  (13.34)  (-4.09)  (1.65)  (0.74)  (1.75)   
If Husband’s Education University            2.29 
            (0.87) 
# of Children>2            -0.15 
            (-0.03) 
Works in the Health Sector            -1.19 
            (-0.41) 
Wife’s Age>30            -2.65 
            (-1.04) 
Market Intensity             
No Control Variables  62.63  7.72  -1.90  -1.59  -3.49   
  (66.94)  (5.14)  (-1.26)   (-0.65)  (-1.82)    
With Control Variables  61.55  6.88  -4.60  -2.82  -7.42   
  (41.85)  (4.08)  (-2.05)  (-1.04)  (-2.27)   
Husband’s Education University            2.33 
            (0.87) 
# of Children>2            5.62 
            (0.94) 
Works in the Health Sector            2.53 
            (0.86) 
Wife’s Age>30            1.62 
            (0.63) 
Wife’s working hours             
No Control Variables  21.95  7.15  -2.17  -2.11  -4.28   
  (29.87)  (6.06)  (-1.83)  (-1.10)  (-2.84)    
With Control Variables  21.10  6.85  -4.12  -2.41  -6.53   
  (18.28)  (5.17)  (-2.34)  (-1.13)  (-2.54)   
Husband’s Education University            0.02 
            (0.01) 
# of Children>2            2.89 
            (0.61) 
Works in the Health Sector            1.87 
            (0.81) 
Wife’s Age>30            2.14 
            (1.05) 
Husband’s working hours             
No Control Variables  40.68  0.58  0.27  0.52  0.79   
  (71.57)  (0.63)  (0.29)   (1.35)  (0.68)   
With Control Variables  40.45  0.04  -0.48  -0.41  -0.89   
  (45.16)  (0.04)  (-0.35)  (-0.25)  (-0.45)   
Husband’s Education University            2.31 
            (1.42) 
Children>2            2.73 
            (0.75) 
Works in the Health Sector            0.67 
            (0.38) 
Wife’s Age>30            -0.52 
            (-0.04) 
 
t ratio  in parenthesis;  0 b ”  constant for low education level;  0 0 g b + ”  constant for high education level; 
3 b ” reform’s effect on  low educated;  3 g ” difference in the effect of the reform for low and high educated; 
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